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Abstract
This study investigates why externally advised real estate investment trusts (REITs) underperform their
internally managed counterparts. Consistent with previous studies, we ®nd that REITs managed by external
advisors underperform internally managed ones by over 7 percent per year. Property-level cash-¯ow yields are
similar between the two managerial forms, but corporate-level expenses and especially interest expenses are
responsible for lower levels of cash available to shareholders in externally advised REITs. We document that
the higher-interest expenses are due to both higher levels of debt and to higher debt yields for externally advised
REITs. We posit that compensating managers based on either assets under management or on property-level
cash ¯ows creates incentives for managers to increase the asset base by issuing debt even if the interest costs are
unfavorable.
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1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a rapid evolution in both the legal organization of claims to
real estate assets held by investors and in the compensation of managers of these assets.
The predominant real estate investment vehicle of the 1980s, the syndicated real estate
limited partnership (RELP), is now relatively rare. In its place, real estate investment trusts
(REITs) have burgeoned as the preferred real estate investment vehicle.
The compensation of real estate management has also evolved. Most RELPs were
managed by their sponsors, who typically held a 1 percent general partnership interest but
whose compensation derived primarily from asset-based or property-income-based
management contracts.
Many REITs have been managed by external advisors under contracts similar to those
found in the RELPs. Three types of fees are common among external advisor contracts.
First and most common are fees based on total assets under management (65 percent of
external advisor contracts). Other contracts specify fees as a percent of property-level
income (62 percent) (rental income minus property expenses) or as a percentage of
transactions volume (55 percent) (e.g., purchases and sales of properties, or issuance of
mortgages). Advisors often receive more than one type of compensation. These three
contract types are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. It is possible for an external
advisor contract to include some, all, or none of the three. Our focus is on the 85 percent of
external-advisor contracts that are based on either assets or property income or both.
It is now more common for a REIT to be internally managed rather than externally
managed. For REITs where internal staff make asset and liability management decisions,
manager compensation is typically in the form of salary and performance incentives based
on corporate-level rather than property-level cash ¯ows. This parallel existence of
alternative types of management contracts and compensation schemes among the publicly
traded REITs provides the key design feature of this study. Speci®cally, the performance
of the two classes of trusts, which are essentially identical in every way except for the
management compensation structure, provides a unique laboratory for the study of
contracts, incentives, and performance.
Further, since most REITs, unlike their RELP predecessors, are publicly traded, they are
subject to Security and Exchange Commission disclosure requirements, ensuring the
availability of a rich source of ®nancial and asset data. Equity market trading generates a
continual ¯ow of information on the ®nancial-asset-market valuation of these assets. As a
result, we can perform our study of contracts, incentives, and performance along a number
of dimensions.
Our primary focus is on the relationship between organizational form and agency costs.
Agency theory argues that incentives can lead to managerial actions that are not optimal
from shareholders' perspectives. Misalignment of incentives occurs when managerial
compensation packages are structured so that managers have incentives that are not
perfectly correlated with maximizing shareholder wealth. Sagalyn (1996) argues that a
misalignment of incentives exists for REITs that are managed externally (i.e., managed by
advisors), while, with internal management, the potential for con¯icts of interest is
reduced.
The key distinction between the two managerial arrangements is not the existence or
absence of an arm's-length relationship between the manager and shareholders but rather a
prevalence of contracts that compensate external advisors based on metrics other than
shareholder wealth. Indeed, the majority of external advisors are compensated as a
percentage of assets, as a percentage of property-level cash ¯ows, or as a combination of
the two.
Using a variety of metrics, we demonstrate that externally managed REITs
underperform and are priced at a discount relative to their internally managed
counterparts. Shareholders of externally advised REITs realized returns that were more
than 7 percent per year below those realized by shareholders of internally managed REITs
over the sample period from 1985 to 1992. Further, using our version of Tobin's q (the
ratio of the equity-market value to the property-market value of the REITs assets), we
demonstrate that underperformance was at least partially anticipated for externally
managed REITs.
Our study is not the ®rst to document underperformance for externally managed REITs.
Howe and Shilling (1990) demonstrated that externally managed REITs experience
negative abnormal returns over the 1973 to 1987 period on average. Hsieh and Sirmans
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(1991) found that ``noncaptive'' REITs (i.e., those REITs that do not have business
relationships with external sponsors or advisors) outperformed captive ones over the 1968
to 1986 period, and Cannon and Vogt (1995) found that internally managed REITs
outperformed advisor REITs over their 1987 to 1992 sample period even after adjusting
for differences in market risk.
Our study does offer at least two important extensions to these ®ndings. First, unlike the
time-series approaches used in previous studies, we augment our analysis with cross-
sectional analyses based on our variant of Tobin's q. We choose q ratios for reasons similar
to those expounded by Lang and Stulz (1994, p. 1249), who argue that ``By focusing on
Tobin's q, rather than on performance over time, we avoid some of the problems of the
earlier literature . . . since q is the present value of future cash ¯ows divided by replacement
costs, no risk adjustment or normalization is required to compare q across ®rms.'' Since
existing evidence (Finnerty and Park, 1991; Cannon and Vogt, 1995) as well as our results
®nd signi®cant differences in the riskiness of externally managed versus internally
managed equity, it is imperative that any measure of relative performance control for these
differences. We believe that the use of a q-ratio metric provides an exact control.
Our second, and more important, contribution is to identify both the avenue through
which managerial structure affects ®rm valuation and the speci®c suboptimal behavior of
external advisors. We begin with the hypothesis ®rst suggested by Jenkins (1980) and
empirically veri®ed by Finnerty and Park (1991) that external advisors would prefer to
expand their asset base through the use of leverage. Finding a greater use of debt in the
capital structure should not directly lead to a reduction in value. Indeed, the famous
Modigliani-Miller capital structure paradigm states that, in a tax-free environment, capital
structure should be irrelevant for valuation. However, such a conclusion is predicated on
debt contracts that are negotiated at equilibrium interest rates that re¯ect the riskiness of
the debt.
In contrast, we ®nd that externally managed REITs issue debt with promised rates that
exceed the rates on debt issued by internally managed REITs. The higher interest rates are
not fully explained by a greater use of debt in externally managed REITs. Further, these
debt contracts are negotiated at rates that exceed the current yield on projects purchased
with the loaned funds. It is the use of debt negotiated at seemingly above market rates that
systematically reduces cash ¯ows available to shareholders.
We argue that such suboptimal behavior by managers can be rationalized by examining
the bases of their compensation. External advisors are primarily compensated as a
percentage of either the total assets under management or the property-level cash ¯ows of
the assets. In neither case do interest expenses impact the base for their compensation.
Thus, they have little incentive to negotiate for favorable debt rates. Indeed, since issuing
debt and using the proceeds to purchase more real assets increases assets and property-
level cash ¯ows, external managers have incentives to issue debt, regardless of the interest
rate. It is this incentive to issue debt combined with the lack of incentive to do so at
competitive rates that can lead to a reduction in equity value. Further, we demonstrate that,
once differences in interest rates are accommodated, there are no detectable effects of
managerial form.
In the following section, we outline the model underlying our estimates. Section 3
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provides a description of the data and variables used in this study. In Section 4, we contrast
the performance characteristics of equity claims on externally and internally managed
REITs using both time-series and cross-sectional methods. In the time-series regressions we
explicitly accommodate for differences in market risk. In the cross-sectional method, using
q ratios circumvents the need for risk adjustments. We next examine the impact of
managerial form on each of the determinants of cash ¯ows available to shareholders, with an
emphasis on debt and interest expenses. In the penultimate section, we investigate whether
organizational structure has any remaining effect on relative valuation after controlling for
the indirect effects of the abnormally high rates of interest paid. The ®nal section provides a
summary and discusses the implications of these ®ndings on optimal managerial contracts.
2. The model
The model underlying our empirical speci®cation is the fundamental dividend discount
relationship. If Vt is the value of a share of stock at time t, Dt is the dividend paid at time t,






For REITs, the cash ¯ow available to be distributed to shareholders, Ct, is simply the
cash ¯ow from properties, Yt, minus any interest expense, It, and corporate overhead
expenses (general and administrative expenses), Gt:
Ct  Yt ÿ It ÿ Gt: 2




Yt ÿ It ÿ Gteÿrtdt: 3
From (3), it is clear that for advisory contracts to affect value or return, the channel must
be through at least one of the components of cash ¯ow. Therefore, to trace the impact of
management contracts we explore each component separately. It is reasonable to expect
each component to depend on total assets, total liabilities, or both. In addition, we
hypothesize that the type of management contract, M, and a vector of other exogenous
variables, X, may affect cash ¯ow as well. We can write
Y  yA;M;X 4
I  iL;M;X 5
G  gA; L;M;X; 6
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where A is total assets and L is total liabilities.
Our empirical strategy is to estimate each of the relationships in (4) to (6) and then test
for the signi®cance of management type in the equation for each cash-¯ow component. By
doing so, we will be able to determine the source of the value loss arising from external
advisors.
3. Data and variables
The database, introduced and described in detail in Capozza and Lee (1995), contains a
subset of the REITs listed in the NAREIT (National Association of Real Estate Investment
Trusts) source books from 1985 to 1992. This database contains only equity REITs and
excludes all mortgage, hotel, restaurant, and health-care REITs; REITs that do not trade on
the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ; and REITs for which property information is not
available. These restrictions create a set of 75 REITs, which are listed in Table 1, and a
sample of 298 usable annual observations. For each observation, balance sheet, income
statement, and property variables were manually extracted from 10K reports, annual
reports to shareholders, and proxy statements.
The database also provides estimates of the values of the real estate properties held.
Property-speci®c capitalization rates were assigned to each property based on its location
and type by Capozza and Lee. They next calculated an individual REIT's average
capitalization rate as the weighted average of the component property capitalization rates.
Finally, net asset values were estimated by subtracting liabilities from estimated property
assets plus other assets. Additional adjustments, where appropriate, were made for joint
ventures, differences between coupon rates and market yields on debt, and property
turnover.
Estimates of the underlying property market values are of particular interest since they
allow us to examine the relationship between equity market values and replacement values
with enhanced statistical power. Because the underlying assetsÐreal propertiesÐare
traded in a relatively active primary market, we are able to obtain estimates of the
replacement cost of assets with much greater precision than previous studies. Since active
markets for underlying assets do not exist for the majority of industries, previous studies
could only coarsely estimate replacement costs by accumulating historical capital
investment and adjusting for in¯ation and estimated economic depreciation (Lindenberg
and Ross, 1981). In contrast, our replacement-cost estimates are based on recent market
transactions prices of assets similar to those underlying each REIT.
For this study, the classi®cation of external advisory contracts is of particular interest.
For each REIT with an external advisor, 10Ks were reviewed to determine the basis of
compensation. The most common types of fees are fees based on total assets under
management (65 percent of external advisor contracts), fees as a percent of property
income (62 percent), and fees based on a percentage of transactions volume (55 percent).
As indicated earlier it is possible for an external advisor contract to include some, all or
none of the three types. Our focus is on the 85 percent of external-advisor contracts that are
based at least partly on either assets or property income or both. Most of the remaining
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Table 1. The sample REITs. The sample of REITs, drawn from the equity REIT Database project, are described
in Capozza and Lee (1995). This database is constructed from the 1992 NAREIT (National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts) source book, which lists all publicly traded REITs (209 REITs) as of December 31,
1991. The database excludes all mortgage, hotel, restaurant, and hospital REITs and REITs that do not trade on
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ or for which property information is not available. These exclusions lead to a
sample of 75 REITs, which are listed here. Given this list, the researchers then attempted to construct one
observation per REIT for each of the years between 1985 and 1992. Of the 75 equity REITs, 32 appear in all eight
years and are annotated with an asterisk (*), with the remaining appearing for at least one year.
*BRE Properties, Inc. *One Liberty Properties, Inc.
Berkshire Realty Co., Inc. PS Business Parks, Inc.
*Bradley Real Estate Trust Partners Preferred Yield, Inc.
Burnham Paci®c Properties, Inc. Partners Preferred Yield II
*California Real Estate Investment Trust Partners Preferred Yield III
Cedar Income Fund, Ltd. *Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust
Cedar Income Fund 2, Ltd. *Property Trust America
Chicago Dock and Canal Trust *Prudential Realty Trust
*Clevetrust Realty Investors Public Storage Properties VI
*Continental Mortgage & Equity Trust Public Storage Properties VII
Copley Property, Inc. Public Storage Properties VIII
Cousins Properties, Inc. Public Storage Properties IX, Inc.
Dial Reit, Inc. Public Storage Properties X, Inc.
Duke Realty Investments, Inc. Public Storage Properties XI, Inc.
*EQK Realty Investors Public Storage Properties XII
*Eastgroup Properties Public Storage Properties XIV
*Federal Realty Investment Trust Public Storage Properties XV, Inc.
*First Union Real Estate Equity and Motgage Investments Public Storage Properties XVI
Grubb & Ellis Realty, Inc. Trust Public Storage Properties XVII
*HRE Properties Public Storage Properties XVIII
*ICM Property Investors, Inc. Public Storage Properties XIX
*IRT Property Co. Public Storage Properties XX
Income Opportunity Realty Trust *Real Estate Investment Trust Ca
Koger Equity, Inc. Realty South Investors, Inc.
Landsing Paci®c Fund *Santa Anita Realty Enterprises
Linpro Speci®ed Properties Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.
*MGI Properties, Inc. *Trammell Crow Real Estate Investment
*MSA Realty Corp. *Transcontinental Rlty Investors
*Meridian Point Realty Trust 83 *U S P Real Estate Investment Trust
*Meridian Point Realty Trust 84 *United Dominion Realty Trust Inc.
Meridian Point Realty Trust IV Vanguard Real Estate Fund I
Meridian Point Realty Trust VI Vanguard Real Estate Fund II
Meridian Point Realty Trust VII Vinland Property Trust
Meridian Point Realty Trust VIII *Washington Real Estate Investment Trust
*Merry Land and Investment, Inc. *Weingarten Realty Investors
Monmouth Real Estate Investment Corp. *Western Investment Real Estate Trust
*New Plan Realty Trust Wetterau Properties, Inc.
*Nooney Realty Trust, Inc.
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contracts (75 percent of the remaining 15 percent) could not be classi®ed because the
information on the nature of the contract was either missing or undecipherable.
Table 2 contains means of variables used in this analysis for the entire sample
n  298, for the subsample of observations corresponding to REITs with an external
advisor compensated with an asset- or income-based fee n  99, and for the remaining
observations where no such structure exists n  199. The ®nal column contains t-
statistics associated with the hypothesis that the two subsample means are equal.
A comparison of means of assets and dollar volume provides evidence that externally
managed REITs are signi®cantly smaller than their internally managed counterparts. One
explanation for this ®nding may be that smaller REITs do not have an asset base that
justi®es the attention of a full-time management team. As a result, external ( part-time)
advisors are selected for these REITs. The weighted-average capitalization rate for
internally managed REITs is signi®cantly larger than the average rate for internally
managed REITs. Although externally advised REITs have, on average, higher general and
administrative (G&A) expense ratios, this difference is not statistically signi®cant.
However, there is strong evidence that both the use of debt and the interest paid on this
debt are signi®cantly larger for externally advised REITs. These two results provide some
preliminary support to our assertion that managers who are compensated on an asset- or
income-based fee attempt to increase their fees by issuing debt and investing the proceeds
into income generating assets.
We also consider two measures of the focus or diversi®cation of the asset base. Our
measures of focus are Her®ndahl indices based on property type and regional location. The




t , where St is the proportion of a
®rm's assets invested in each of four real estate types: of®ce, warehouse, retail, or
Table 2. Summary statistics. This table reports means, standard deviations, and extreme values for a number of
summary statistics calculated across our sample of 298 observations for 75 ®rms. Market value of assets is
estimated market value of properties plus the book value of other assets. The leverage ratio is de®ned as total
liabilities/(total liabilities  market value of the equity). q-ratio is the ratio of market equity (stock price times











Market value of assets ($ mil.) 176.8 90.0 219.9 5.8
Quarterly dollar volume ($ mil.) 131.2 60.8 162.2 5.3
Weighted capitalization rate (%) 8.91 8.82 8.97 2.2
G&A/Total assets (%) 1.14 1.23 1.09 ÿ 1.5
Interest expense/Debt (%) 8.05 9.00 7.59 ÿ 3.3
Corporate cash¯ow yield (%) 8.95 8.82 9.02 0.3
Leverage ratio (%) 35.8 42.9 32.3 ÿ 3.3
Property type Her®ndahl (%) 66.8 62.0 69.2 2.4
Regional Her®ndahl (%) 58.2 57.1 58.8 0.5
q-ratio 1.00 0.95 1.02 1.4
DEBT, AGENCY, AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS IN REITS 97
apartment. Higher levels of concentration by property type lead to higher levels of the
index. If the ®rm is highly focused along one dimension, the index is close to one; while
the index approaches 0.25, if the ®rm's portfolio of properties is equally diversi®ed across




r, where Sr is the
proportion of a ®rm's assets invested in each of eight real estate regions: New England,
Middle Atlantic, Southeast, Midwest, Plains, Southwest, South Paci®c, and North Paci®c.
As with the property-type Her®ndahl variable, this concentration variable can vary from
one for a geographically focused REIT to 0.125 for a REIT with holdings equally
diversi®ed across the eight regions. There is evidence that internally managed REITs are
more focused along both the property type and regional dimensions, but only the property-
type dimension is statistically signi®cant.
Finally, we construct our modi®ed q ratios by dividing the equity-market value of equity
by the property-market (replacement) value of properties plus the book value of other
assets minus the book value of debt. Other assets and debt are predominantly current assets
or liabilities with low durations. Thus, deviations between book and market values for
other assets and debt tend to be small. While we recognize that these estimates of value
contain measurement error, we believe they are the most sophisticated available. Further,
given the homogeneity of the assets and the methodology employed, we posit that our
estimates of property-market values of assets are economically less noisy than those used
in other studies to estimate Tobin's q, which are usually based on the depreciated
accounting cost of assets. Using this univariate technique, there is weak evidence p41
that internally advised REITs are priced at a larger multiple of their underlying assets than
externally advised ones.
4. Results: Performance and relative valuation
In this section, we pursue two empirical objectives. First, we examine whether the asset- or
income-based externally managed REITs underperformed their internally managed
counterparts over our sample period. Similar to earlier studies (Howe and Shilling, 1990;
Hsieh and Sirmans, 1991; and Cannon and Vogt, 1995), we demonstrate that
underperformance exists within our subsample using ex post analyses. However, unlike
past studies, which use a stock-market index, we control for both market and industry risk
by using a real estate market index to proxy for differences in risk levels or exposures.
Results are qualitatively similar if only a stock-market index is included. Second, in
contrast to past studies, we supplement our analyses by using ex ante measures of
anticipated future performance. Using q ratios, the ratio of the stock-market value of assets
to the underlying property-market value of assets, we are able to extract expectations of
future performance. Differences between the stock-market value and the property-market
values of assets re¯ect the expected impact of management or organizational form on
value. Further, since there is a relatively active market for the underlying real assets in this
industry, such measures of the effects of management on value will be more accurate than
similar measures calculated for other industries (Capozza and Seguin, 1998b; Bradley,
Capozza, and Seguin, 1998).
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4.1. Ex post performance measures
To examine the impact of management structure on realized returns, we follow the lead of
previous studies and examine returns using a single-factor model. However, in contrast to
these studies, we do not use the returns to a well diversi®ed portfolio of industrial equities
but instead use as our factor the returns to a portfolio of REITs: the NAREIT index. By
relating returns to the industry index rather than the market index, the common factor
among these ®rms is more ef®ciently extracted, and the precision of estimates is improved.
In the ®rst column of Panel A of Table 3, we report estimates of the single-factor model
using all observations. The coef®cient associated with the index is insigni®cantly different
from unity, suggesting that the riskiness of our sample is equal to the average riskiness of
the universe of publicly traded REITs. The intercept coef®cient is negative and signi®cant,
however, suggesting that our sample, as a whole, underperformed the universe. In the
second column, we allow the intercept to vary between internally and externally managed
trusts. The intercept, which is an estimate of the relative performance of internally
managed REITs, is negative but insigni®cantly different from zero, suggesting that these
trusts performed as well as the universe. In contrast, the coef®cient associated with an
externally managed REIT is signi®cantly negative and suggests that the subsample of
externally managed REITs underperformed the internally managed universe by 7.1
percent per year.
There is evidence in this and other studies, however, that the amount of ®nancial risk
(leverage) differs between the two classes of trusts. As a result, estimating a single risk
coef®cient may result in a misspeci®cation. To mitigate this problem, we allow the slope
coef®cient to vary between internally and externally managed trusts. The results,
presented in the next two columns of Table 3, suggest that externally managed REITs have
higher levels of systematic risk, but the coef®cients estimating the differences in this risk
are not reliably greater than zero. However, the indicator associated with externally
managed trusts remains signi®cantly negative.
In the second panel, we investigate the source of the higher risk associated with
externally managed REITs. Speci®cally, we investigate whether externally managed
REITs have greater risk due to higher business risk (i.e., they choose riskier projects) or
due to higher ®nancial risk (i.e., greater leverage). To do so, we use the fact that equity
betas equal asset betas multiplied by a leverage factor, or.
bequity  bassets1 Debt/Equity: 7
Substituting this into the single-factor model speici®cation yields
Rjt  a bassets1 Debt/EquityRNAREIT: 8
In Panel B of Table 3, therefore, we regress observed returns on the product of the
NAREIT index returns and the leverage factor. The coef®cient associated with this
product can be interpreted as an asset beta. The results in the ®rst column of this panel
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indicate that the typical asset beta is around 0.25. The intercept is negative and signi®cant,
suggesting that the REITs in our sample underperformed, on average, by about 3.6 percent
per year. In the second column, we again allow the intercept to vary between the two
classes of trusts. The intercept is now insigni®cantly different from zero, suggesting that
the internally managed trust in our sample performed as well as the universe. In contrast,
the coef®cient associated with the externally managed trusts is signi®cantly negative.
Further, the coef®cient suggests that these trusts underperformed by over 12 percent per
annum.
In the ®nal two columns, we allow the asset beta to vary between the two classes of
trusts. However, in neither speci®cation is this difference statistically or economically
meaningful. This result suggests that the higher level of risk associated with externally
managed trusts in this and previous studies can be completely attributed to higher ®nancial
risk. There is no evidence that externally managed trusts systematically choose projects
with higher business risk (asset risk).
Most important, however, the coef®cient associated with the underperformance of
externally managed REITs remains negative and signi®cant. Indeed, the magnitude of this
coef®cient suggests that the externally managed REITs in our sample underperformed
their internally managed counterparts by over 13 percent per year, a remarkably poor
performance by any standard.
4.2. Ex ante performance measures
In the previous subsection, we documented that externally managed REITs under-
performed their internally managed counterparts. As indicated above, this
underperformance has been documented previously. However, none of the earlier studies
has investigated whether the impact of external management on cash ¯ows is anticipated.
To do so, we investigate ex ante measures of relative valuation.
The ®rst column of Table 4 presents estimates of a speci®cation where our modi®ed q
ratio is regressed against a series of annual intercepts. As discussed in the data section, the
dependent variable is a q ratio de®ned as the equity-market value of equity divided by the
net replacement value of equity. The denominator is calculated by adding the property-
market value of the real estate assets and the book value of other assets and then
subtracting the book value of debt. Since this ®rst speci®cation contains only annual
intercepts, the estimated coef®cients can be interpreted as annual averages of the ratio.
These averages declined from their peak in 1987 until 1991. This decline can be attributed
to equity-market agents correctly anticipating declines in property-market values due to
overbuilding throughout the 1980s (see Hendershott and Kane, 1995).
The second equation in Table 4 includes an indicator variable that equals one if the ®rm
is externally managed based on an income- or asset-related fee. The coef®cient indicates
that the equity-market value of these ®rms is discounted by 7 percent. Next, we consider
the two compensation structures individually. Unfortunately, such analysis is hampered by
the high degree of correlation between the two structures. Speci®cally, of the 72
observations with an income-related fee and 76 observations with an asset-based fee, 49
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have both, leading to a correlation between these variables in excess of 0.55. The results of
this colinearity can be seen in column 3: the signi®cance of the individual coef®cients is
reduced, and yet they remain jointly signi®cant. Further, we cannot reject the null that the
two coef®cients equal each other, consistent with the belief that the choice between
income-based and asset-based does not differentially impact valuation.
Table 4. Management structure and q ratios. The dependent variable is the ratio of the Wall Street value of equity
to the difference between the property-market value of assets and the book value of debt. Estimation is by
ordinary least squares. Indicator variables capturing calendar year are used as intercepts. Property-type focus is a
Her®ndahl coef®cient generated by summing the squared proportions of a ®rm's assets invested in each of four
real estate types. Regional-focus is, similarly, a Her®ndahl index computed across eight geographic regions. t-
statistics are in parentheses. The F-test for joint signi®cance tests whether the two coef®cients associated with the
two management indicators are simultaneously equal to zero, while the F-test for equality tests whether the two
coef®cients associated with the two management indicators are equal to each other. Asterisks indicate whether
these test-statistics exceed the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) critical values.
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5)
1985 1.01 1.03 1.03 0.93 0.93
1986 1.11 1.14 1.14 1.04 1.05
1987 1.16 1.19 1.19 1.07 1.08
1988 1.04 1.07 1.07 0.97 0.98
1989 1.03 1.06 1.06 0.96 0.97
1990 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.91 0.91
1991 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.79 0.80
1992 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.83
Income/Asset based external management ÿ 0.07 ÿ 0.07
(ÿ 2.3)** (ÿ 2.2)*
Asset-based external management ÿ 0.07 ÿ 0.07
(ÿ 1.8) (ÿ 1.7)*
Income-based external management ÿ 0.02 ÿ 0.01
(ÿ 0.5) (ÿ 0.3)
Property-type focus 0.02 0.02
(0.4) (0.4)
Regional focus 0.08 0.08
(1.5) (1.5)
Dollar volume/equity 0.03 0.03
(1.3) (1.3)
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
F-test for joint signi®cance 3.14** 2.40*
F-test for equality 1.00 0.06
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4.3. Robustness tests
To test the robustness of these ®ndings, we alter the speci®cation to account for assetbase
focus and equity liquidity. Capozza and Seguin (1998b) examine q-ratio measures for
REITs and argue that focus affects relative value through liquidity. Following their lead,
we include two dimensions of asset focus (regional focus and property-type focus) and a
measure of liquidity (annual equity turnover). Consistent with their conjectures, our results
show that more focused and more liquid REITs have higher q-ratios. Further, the three
variables are jointly signi®cant F  6:784F3;?;0:99  3:78.
However, despite the inclusion of these additional explanatory variables, our primary
conclusions are unchanged. In equation (4), the signi®cant coef®cient associated with the
single indicator variable suggests that these forms of managerial contracts reduce relative
value by about 7 percent. Further, in equation (5), the two individual indicators remain
jointly signi®cant, and we again cannot reject the null that the two coef®cients are equal.
As mentioned above, the dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of the
equity-market valuation of equity to the property-market or replacement value of the
equity. We reestimated the same ®ve speci®cations using a ratio of asset values. Such a
transformation is accomplished by adding the value of debt to both numerator and
denominator. Not surprisingly, our conclusions are invariant with an estimated wealth loss
of 7 percent associated with this organizational structure.
We further examined speci®cations with stock-market values of either assets or equity
as the dependent variable and property-market values of the corresponding variable as an
independent variable. An estimate of a relative discount can be constructed by adding as
an additional independent variable the product of the indicator variable with the property-
market variables. Although not reported, we estimated a number of variants that
accommodated focus and liquidity. Regardless of the speci®cation, there was a statistically
signi®cant discount in stock-market valuation that ranged from 7 percent to 15 percent.
The smallest (in an absolute value sense) t-statistic was ÿ 2.8.
We therefore conclude, based on the analyses performed in this section, that the
external-advisor structure reduces the wealth of shareholders and that this wealth
reduction is partially anticipated. That is, current share prices are discounted to re¯ect the
anticipated wealth loss or lower cash ¯ows available to shareholders. However, since
investors who purchased equity claims even at these discounted values suffered
underperformance during the sample period, we conclude that, in our sample period,
the anticipation was incomplete and that the discount in share price was insuf®cient to
offset the underperformance during the sample period. We next turn to an investigation of
the avenues through which asset- or income-based external management results in inferior
performance.
5. Sources of underperformance
In this section, we examine ®nancial data for our sample and test the two fundamental
hypotheses of our study: (1) whether incentive contracts based on property income or
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assets induce external managers to increase the base of their compensation by issuing debt
and using the proceeds to invest in properties and (2) whether they do so regardless of
whether they must pay supernormal interest costs.
5.1. Management structure and the use of debt
We investigate the relationship between management form or compensation and capital
structure by examining ®nancial leverage while controlling for the underlying asset base.
In our initial speci®cation, which appears as equation (1) in Table 5, we regress the
average of the book values of debt at the beginning and end of the ®scal year on the
average of the property-market (replacement) value of assets at the beginning and end of
the ®scal year. There are no intercepts in these regressions, but estimation is by weighted
least squares, with the average asset variable used as a weight. As a result, the coef®cient
can be interpreted as the (weighted) average debt-to-assets or, equivalently, debt-to-debt-
plus-equity ratio. The coef®cient indicates that this average is 35 percent, which is
comparable to the average reported in Table 2.
To determine the impact of the structure/compensation, we allow the leverage ratio to
vary with the external management indicator. To do so, we extend the initial speci®cation
above:
Debt  b Assets e; 9
Table 5. Management compensation form and leverage. The dependent variable is the average of the book values
of debt at the beginning and end of the ®scal year. Assets are the average of the property-market or replacement
value of assets at the beginning and end of the ®scal year. Estimation is by weighted least squares, with the
average asset variable used as a weight. There are no intercepts in these regressions. Property-type focus is a
Her®ndahl coef®cient generated by summing the squared proportions of a ®rm's assets invested in each of four
real estate types. Regional-focus is, similarly, a Her®ndahl index computed across eight geographic regions. t-
statistics are in parentheses. All coef®cients are multiplied by 100. Asterisks indicate whether these test-statistics
exceed the 10% (*) 5% (**), or 1% (***) critical values.
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3)
Average assets 34.8 33.1 21.5
(25.2)*** (22.4)*** (4.0)***






Adjusted R2 0.73 0.74 0.75
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where b is the estimate of leverage by allowing b to vary with the indicator:
b  bint  bextIncome- or Asset-Based External Compensation Indicator: 10
Substitution of (10) into (9) indicates that the proper speci®cation includes not the
indicator itself but the interaction of the indicator with the property-market (``Main
Street'') value of the assets.
The results appear in the second column. The variable associated with the product of the
indicator variable and assets is economically and statistically signi®cant, indicating that
externally managed REITs carry 11 percent more debt in their capital structure.
One possibility is that the intrinsic nature of the assets under management differs
between the two types of trusts. If, for example, one class of trusts has assets that have a
higher collateral value or that are easier to monitor, then such differences must be
accommodated. To do so, we follow Capozza and Seguin (1998b) and Bradley, Capozza,
and Seguin (1998), who argue that collateral value varies with focus. We employ two
proxies for focus, regional and property-type Her®ndahl indices, as described in the data
section. These variables are included in the third speci®cation of Table 5.
There is evidence consistent with the belief that asset portfolios that are more focused
along the property-type dimension provide greater collateral value. The coef®cient
associated with that focus variable is positive and signi®cant. This result is consistent with
the hypothesis that lenders are, ceteris paribus, more willing to make loans backed by
focused portfolios. Most important, however, is the coef®cient associated with
management structure, which remains signi®cant. The point estimate now exceeds 13
percent.
5.2. Management structure and free cash ¯ow
In this section we implement the empirical strategy outlined in Section 2 to investigate the
role of management structure on cash available to shareholders. We do so by tracing the
effect of structure on each line in a REIT's income statement. First, we examine the
relationship between incentives and property-level cash ¯ows. We then examine their
effects on corporate-level expenses (G&A expenses) and on interest expenses. We
conclude by examining the relationship between management structure and residual or
free cash ¯ows.
5.2.1. Project-level cash ¯ows
As a baseline model, we regress property-level cash ¯owsÐthe difference between
property-level revenues (rents) and property-level expenses (maintenance, property taxes,
utilities, etc.)Ðon our estimates of the property-market values of the assets held by the
REIT. The resulting coef®cient is a property level or ``gross'' yield. This speci®cation is
estimated using weighted-least-squares with asset replacement values used as weights and
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allowing for intercepts that vary annually and appears in the ®rst column of Table 6. The
estimated coef®cient associated indicates that REITs earn, on average, a gross yield of 8.3
percent, which is consistent with the range of capitalization rates presented in Table 2.
The analysis can address whether external managers who are compensated based on
assets or income choose higher-yielding properties when they diversify. Since their
compensation contract may not explicitly accommodate for differences in risk, external
managers may have a preference for assets with higher levels of both expected return and
risk. To empirically test for this behavior among REIT managers, we modify the previous
speci®cation and allow the yield to vary with the external management indicator.
Abstracting from our use of weighted-least-squares and annual intercepts, the benchmark
speci®cation is
Cash flows  b assets e;
so that b is a measure of the cash-¯ow yield.
As above, we allow b to vary with the indicator; therefore, the appropriate speci®cation
includes not the indicator itself but the interaction of the indicator with the property-
market (``Main Street'') value of the assets.1
Estimates of this speci®cation are presented in the second column of Table 6. The results
provide little evidence that external managers choose projects with higher expected gross
cash-¯ow yields. Although the coef®cient is positive, it is insigni®cant at any traditional
signi®cance level.
The third speci®cation presented in Table 6 augments the previous speci®cation by
including debt and debt multiplied by the management structure indicator. We include this
speci®cation for two reasons. First, this speci®cation can be considered a test of robustness
of our results to alternative functional forms. Second and more important, these additional
variables become relevant for the analysis of the corporate expenses and cash ¯ows below.
The results of this speci®cation suggest dependence between investing and ®nancing
decisions. The coef®cient associated with assets suggests a yield of 7.2 percent for
unlevered, internally managed ®rms. However, the yield increases by 105 basis points for
unlevered externally managed ®rms. Surprisingly, the coef®cient associated with
liabilities is positive and signi®cant. This coef®cient indicates that REITs with higher
debt levels in their capital structures also hold assets with higher gross cash-¯ow yields,
suggesting that leverage and asset risk are complimentary for our sample. However, this
increase is pertinent only for internally managed REITs. For externally managed ones, an
increase in debt increases gross cash-¯ow yields by only 77 basis points  3:19ÿ 2:42.
We interpret these ®ndings as weak evidence that internally managed REITs use debt
selectively and issue debt to ®nance higher-yielding projects, while externally managed
REITs issue debt indiscriminately.
5.2.2. Corporate-level administration expenses
Two deductions from gross cash ¯ows determine net cash ¯owsÐalternatively called
corporate-level cash ¯ows or funds from operations (FFO). The deductions are interest
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expenses, which we examine in the next subsection, and the cost of the corporate-level
management teamÐthat is, general and administrative (G&A)Ðexpenses, which we
examine here. This measure includes corporate-level asset-management expenses
(including salaries to the management team, ®ling and reporting costs) but excludes all
property-level expenses (such as property management, maintenance, or taxes).
Consistent with the predictions and estimates in Capozza and Segum (1998a), there is
strong evidence linking G&A expenditures to assets under management. The coef®cient
associated with assets is 0.62 suggesting that, on average, G&A expenditures, including
compensation to managers, increases by $6.20 for every $1,000 increase in assets under
management. In this speci®cation, G&A expenditures do not vary with debt. Thus, for
internally managed trusts, G&A varies with assets under management, regardless of how
they are ®nanced.
There is evidence that the relation differs for externally managed trusts. Although each
of the two coef®cients associated with the external advisor indicators is insigni®cant, they
are jointly signi®cant at the 5 percent level. These seemingly contradictory results strongly
indicate the presence of multicolinearity and re¯ect the high correlation between the two
variables. This high correlation in turn re¯ects that, for externally managed trusts, the
dollar amount of debt in the capital structure is highly correlated with the dollar amount of
assets under management, which is consistent with the evidence in Section 5.1.
Nonetheless, the joint signi®cance of the two positive coef®cients indicates that G&A
expenses, expressed as a fraction of assets or debt, are higher for externally managed
trusts. For example, an internally managed trust that increased its asset base by $1,000
while maintaining its leverage ratio (which averages 32.3 percent from Table 2) would
increase its G&A expenditures by $5:97 100060:62%ÿ1000632:3%60:07%.
If the same trust were externally managed, the same asset base increase would result
in an increase in G&A of $8:44 100060:62%0:13%  1000642:9%6
ÿ 0:07%0:29%, which is 25 basis points higher.
5.2.3. Interest expenses
The second expense subtracted from property-level cash ¯ows to calculate cash ¯ows
available for shareholders is interest expense. We use the same functional form and set of
independent variables in investigating the determinants of interest expense that we used in
investigating gross cash ¯ows and G&A expenses.2
The ®fth column of Table 3 contains estimates of parameters linking interest expenses to
assets, liabilities, and managerial structure. The coef®cient linking interest expense with
the amount of debt 8.1 percent, can be interpreted as an estimate of the marginal cost of
debt for internally managed trusts. Further, for such trusts, holding debt constant,
increasing assets, and therefore reducing leverage have no signi®cant impact on the
marginal cost of debt. This suggests that, for these internally managed REITs, debt levels
are low enough so that changes in leverage have no impact on the cost of debt.
In contrast, there is evidence that capital structure affects the cost of debt for externally
managed ®rms. As above, holding debt constant, increasing the assets, and so reducing
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®nancial leverage reduce the marginal cost of debt. This is consistent with the joint
hypothesis that the debt for externally managed trusts is risky and that leverage affects the
premium charged.
Most important, however, is the coef®cient associated with the indicator multiplied by
debt. We interpret this coef®cient as an estimate of the additional marginal cost of debt for
externally managed REITs after controlling for levels of debt and assets (and, therefore,
leverage). This economically and statistically signi®cant coef®cient suggests that these
REITs pay interest rates on debt that are almost 3 percent higher than their internally
managed counterparts.
Since we limit our examination to a single line of business and our model controls for
the determinants of leverage, our methods inherently control for both business risk3 and
®nancial risk. Our point estimates suggest that the typical cost of debt ®nancing for
externally managed REITs is around 11 percent and exceeds the current return on assets,
which is under 9 percent. Managers who receive asset-based or property-level-income-
based compensation have incentives to issue debt (to increase the basis of their
compensation) but have no incentives to do so at a fair market value. Indeed, since
negotiating fair rates may require considerable effort for which the manager is not being
compensated, debt contracts at supernormal rates are to be expected.
5.2.4. Funds available to equity holders
Consistent with the speci®cations used above for corporate-level expenses and interest
expenses, we estimate a speci®cation linking corporate-level cash ¯ows (FFO) to assets,
liabilities, and management form. The results, again using WLS and annual intercepts, are
reported in the sixth column of Table 6. The coef®cient associated with the property-
market value of assets can be interpreted as a net return-on-asset yield estimate. For
reasons outlined above, this estimate of 6.56 percent equals the estimated gross cash-¯ow
yield (7.24 percent) minus the marginal cost of G&A expenses (0.62 percent) and minus
the (insigni®cant) marginal impact of interest expenses (ÿ 0.06). The coef®cient
associated with debt is negative, re¯ecting the interest expense. Note that the difference
between these coef®cients (1.76 percent) represents the marginal corporate-level pro®t
available to internally managed trusts from issuing debt and investing the proceeds in real
assets.
Of principal importance, however, is the link between management-compensation
structure and cash ¯ows available to shareholders. There is strong evidence that corporate-
level cash ¯ows are adversely affected by external management. Speci®cally, increased
debt use by externally managed trusts reduces corporate-level cash ¯ows by 5.56 percent
more than the use of debt by internally managed trusts. Further, the marginal corporate-
level spread to issuing debt and investing in real assets, which was  1.76 percent for
internally managed trusts, is ÿ 2.8 percent  6:56 1:00ÿ 4:80ÿ 5:56. This last result
suggests that externally advised REITs use excessive debt and the issue this debt at
abnormally high rates.
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6. Do abnormal interest costs explain it all?
In the previous section, we provided evidence that externally advised trusts generate lower
cash ¯ows available to shareholders, primarily due to higher relative interest expenses.
The primary objective of this section is to determine whether the underperformance of
externally managed REITs can be attributed entirely to the indirect relationship between
compensation structure and performance via interest costs or whether there exists any
additional, direct relationship between structure and valuation after controlling for the
higher debt charges.
6.1. Abnormal interest costs
As a ®rst step, we construct a model of abnormal interest expense that does not explicitly
include the organizational structure. To do so, we modify the interest expense speci®cation
presented in Table 6 by removing those variables related to managerial compensation
structure. The results appear in the ®rst two columns of Table 7. Consistent with previous
results, the coef®cients associated with the average of the beginning and end-of-year levels
of debt outstanding indicate an average interest expense of around 8 percent of the book
value of debt. The coef®cient associated with assets in the second speci®cation is
insigni®cant and positive suggesting that, as in our discussion of Table 6, the degree of
leverage is not pertinent.
Of primary importance, however, are the residuals from these speci®cations, which we
employ as our proxy for abnormal or unexpected interest expenses. Although we report
results when residuals from the second speci®cation are employed, the results are
unchanged when we use the residuals from the ®rst. Further, results are unchanged if we
use, as our metric of abnormal interest expense, the residuals from the interest-expense
speci®cation from Table 6 and add back the products of the two structure-related variables
and their estimated coef®cients.
6.2. Abnormal interest costs and relative value
Section 4 provided a number of metrics demonstrating underperformance for the
subsample of externally managed trusts. The metric we reported to demonstrate lower
relative values was the ratio of the stock-market value of equity, to the underlying real-
estate value of equity. Here we employ a speci®cation reported as a robustness test in
Section 4.3, with stock-market values of equity as the dependent variable and property-
market values of equity as an independent variable. Since this regression is cast in terms of
dollars, it is convenient for addressing the impact of abnormal interest expenses.
In this framework, we estimate a relative discount by adding as an additional
independent variable, the product of the indicator variable with the property-market
variables. The results, reported in the ®rst column of panel B in Table 7, indicate that
internally managed trusts trade at a 13 percent premium over their intrinsic, or property-
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market net asset value. The t-statistic, reported in brackets, indicates that this coef®cient is
signi®cantly above unity. We interpret this premium as re¯ecting the liquidity gains from
securitizing illiquid real estate assets.
Of primary importance, however, is the coef®cient associated with the product of assets
and an external management indicator. Consistent with the evidence presented in Section
4.2, the estimated coef®cient suggests that such trusts are discounted by about 15 percent.
To detect the valuation effects of excess interest expenses, we include the interest
expense residual in the speci®cation reported in the second column of panel B. Following
Capozza and Seguin (1998a), we interpret this coef®cient as investors' consensus belief
about the net-present-value of a growth perpetuity. That is, if a trust pays an additional
dollar in excess interest expense, investors rationally believe that such expenditure is not a
unique occurrence for that year but is a signal of current and future cash out¯ows. In this
framework, the coef®cient equals 1=r ÿ g, where r and g are the discount and growth
rates of the perpetuity, respectively.
The coef®cient associated with excess interest expense is estimated at ÿ 5.6. Since
surveys (e.g., Korpacz) indicate that a typical discount rate used by investors for real estate
assets during this period was 12 to 14 percent, the coef®cient is consistent with investors'
valuing the excess interest as a perpetuity with a growth rate of ÿ 4 to ÿ 6 percent
e.g.; 1=5:6 ÿ 0:12  0:06, suggesting a half-life of 11 to 17 years. Similarly, using the
average interest yield on externally managed trust debt of 11 percent yields a decay rate of
7 percent and a half-life of over 10 years. These estimates suggest that investors value
these trusts as if contemporaneous increases in excess interest costs have long-horizon
cash-¯ow rami®cations.
In this speci®cation, which controls for excess interest expenses, the coef®cient
associated with externally managed trusts is smaller and becomes insigni®cant.4 We
interpret this as weak evidence that the avenue by which managerial compensation
structure affects value is through the cost of debt.
In the following two columns, we repeat the analysis using a richer model of relative
value. Speci®cally, following the suggestions of Capozza and Seguin (1998b), we include
the focus of the asset base and the liquidity of the traded equity claims. Consistent with
their ®ndings, traded equity claims are more valuable, relative to the replacement value of
the asset base, when the asset base has a more concentrated holding of property types, and/
or when the publicly traded equity is more liquid. However, more important are the
estimates associated with the product of the indicator and equity. As before,
accommodating excess interest expense reduces the magnitude and the signi®cance of
the coef®cient associated with the product, again providing evidence that the primary
avenue through which compensation managerial structure affects value is through the cost
of debt.
7. Summary and conclusions
Our study is by no means the ®rst to document that externally managed REITs
underperform their internally managed counterparts. However, this study has shed much
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light on this puzzling regularity. To summarize our study, we review these contributions in
ascending order of importance. First, unlike past studies, which use only ex post measures
of underperformance, we examine both ex post and ex ante measures. Consistent with past
studies, we ®nd that, using stock return methods, externally advised trusts underperformed
their internally managed counterparts. However, we show that this result holds even after
controlling for differences in risk.
Second, we provide compelling evidence concerning an ongoing debate. Although
previous work has acknowledged that equity claims to externally managed trusts had
higher levels of systematic risk than claims to internally managed trusts, the source of this
greater risk was never identi®ed. To resolve this issue, we estimate ``unlevered'' or asset
betas and ®nd no discernible differences in asset or business risk between the two classes
of trusts. Thus, we conclude that differences in risk are solely attributable to differences in
®nancial risk.
Third, we use q-ratio analysis to determine whether the underperformance of externally
managed trusts is partially or fully anticipated by shareholders. We ®nd that the Wall Street
or equity market value of trusts relative to the main street or property-market value of the
trusts is lower for externally managed trusts, suggesting that underperformance is at least
partially anticipated. Since investments even at these discounted values underperformed
throughout, we conclude that any anticipation was incomplete.
Fourth, we demonstrate that externally managed trusts have greater ®nancial leverage.
The typical internally managed trust is ®nanced with roughly one-third debt, while an
externally managed trust has a capital structure with roughly 44 percent debt. We interpret
this as evidence that managers compensated based on assets under management or
property-level income have incentives to increase their compensation base by issuing debt
and investing the proceeds in additional assets.
Corporate ®nance theory suggests that higher debt levels should not necessarily lead to
lower valuations. Indeed, one of the fundamental axioms of corporate theory is that, in a
tax-free world, value and capital structure should be completely irrelevant. However, such
conclusions are reached only under the assumption of competitive markets, where debt
contracts are negotiated at fair, risk-adjusted discount rates.
The ®fth and most important result is that, for externally managed trusts, debt contracts
are negotiated at excessive rates. Speci®cally, interest expenses are 285 basis points higher
for externally managed trusts than for their internally managed counterparts, on average.
Further such difference cannot be explained by differences in risk or leverage between the
two classes of trusts. Indeed, our estimates indicate that when externally managed trusts
borrow money and invest the proceeds in real assets, they borrow at rates that exceed the
current yield they receive from the property assets.
Finally, we demonstrate that not only is excess interest expense one avenue through
which managerial structure affects valuation and performance but that it may be the sole
avenue. Speci®cally, when we examine the link between organization and value, we ®nd a
strong relationship when excess interest is ignored but an insigni®cant relationship when
we include the impact of excess interest costs.
The existence of publicly traded REITs with both external and internal managers
provides a unique opportunity to contrast the impact of managerial compensation structure
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while holding many other variables constant. The results of our experiment are clear and
de®nitive. External advisers dramatically underperform their internally managed
competitors and the underperformance can be traced primarily to their use (or abuse) of
leverage and debt. Our results have a number of implications for the design of ®nancial
asset claims on real estate assets, for the design of managerial contracts, and for the speed
at which the ®nancial markets learn.
Given the magnitude of the underperformance of externally advised REITs, it would be
surprising if investors did not learn of the differing performance of the two management
structures, and, indeed, our evidence from q ratios indicates that the relative
underperformance of external management is at least partially anticipated in the pricing
of REITs. However, subsequent events also provide evidence that learning occurred. First,
the proportion of REITs that were externally advised has fallen signi®cantly. During our
sample period, the proportion of trusts that were externally managed fell from about half of
the sample to about a quarter. This decline occurred both because existing REITs
converted from external to internal management and because REIT IPOs were more likely
to be internally managed.
A second re¯ection of the growing acknowledgment of the costs of external
management can be found in a controversial recent trend in the industry: the consolidation
of REITs and real estate companies into larger entities. Tax law in the early 1980s
encouraged the proliferation of small RELPs and REITs. Their small-market
capitalization necessitated the use of external advisors rather than internal managers.
Once investors became aware of the poor relative performance of these small entities and
valuations began to re¯ect performance differences, managers could create wealth by
reorganizing into larger, internally managed REITs. Therefore, we attribute at least some
of the recent wave of mergers and liquidations in the industry to a glaring need to rewrite
badly misaligned management contracts that were more likely to be found among small
REITs and RELPs with external management.
Finally, our results reemphasize the importance of incentives for managerial success
and for investor returns. Our experiment using REIT industry data provides some of the
starkest evidence on these issues and some of the most compelling evidence on the
importance and magnitude of the links between executive compensation contracts and
shareholder wealth.
Acknowledgment
We thank seminar participants at the University of Michigan, Rice University, University
of Nebraska, Notre Dame, and the University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments.
Notes
1. Replacing the estimated property-market value of assets with book values gives similar results but with weaker
®t statistics and coef®cients closer to zero, thus suggesting measurement error bias.
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2. Absent an obvious alternative functional form, we employ this speci®cation for an important econometric
reason. Since the speci®cations for gross cash ¯ows, net cash ¯ows and the two corporate-level expenses use
(1) the same dataset of independent variables and (2) identical functional form, differences in the impact of a
factor on gross versus net cash ¯ows can be readily traced and attributed to one of the two corporate-level
expenses. The coef®cient associated with a particular independent variable in the net cash-¯ow speci®cation
must equal the coef®cient associated with that same variable in the gross cash-¯ow speci®cation minus the
coef®cients in the interest and G&A expense speci®cations (see Capozza and Seguin, 1998b).
3. Gyourko and Keim (1992) are unsuccessful in ®nding any systematic relation between equity factors and
contemporaneous returns to the Russell-NCREIF appraisal-based index of property values. Similarly, Geltner
(1989) can ®nd no evidence of systematic risk associated with either the FRC or PRISA indices of property
values, even when delays in updating property-value indices are explicitly modeled. Therefore, we assume that
even if underlying property assets are subject to systematic factors, the cross-sectional variation of the
systematic risk is insigni®cant.
4. The coef®cient is insigni®cant and the t-statistic falls by 43 percent, even though the coef®cient estimate is
only 20 percent smaller than the previous speci®cation. Although this situation is consistent with
multicolinearity, and excess interest expense is correlated with the management structure indicator, we do
not believe that multicolinearity is present for two reasons. First, we use excess interest expense and the
product of the structure indicator and equity. Since externally managed trusts are both smaller and more highly
levered, the correlation between excess interest expense and the product (0.067) is lower than the correlation
between excess interest expense and the indicator alone (0.112). Second, and more important, multicolinearity
will reduce or eliminate the signi®cance of all correlated coef®cients, though the coef®cients will remain
jointly signi®cant. In this case, the excess interest expense coef®cient remains highly signi®cant.
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